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Human Rights Litigation and the National Interest: 
Kiobel’s Application of the Presumption Against 
Extraterritoriality to the Alien Tort Statute 
 
JONATHAN HAFETZ
†
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The debate over the extraterritorial application of the Alien Tort 
Statute (ATS)
1
 raised by Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.
2
 
presumes an underlying tension between a state’s exercise of civil 
universal jurisdiction and its national interest. Realist-based critiques 
of the ATS posit that harmful consequences result when the United 
States provides a civil remedy for human rights abuses that occur in 
foreign territory, even where the conduct transgresses universally 
recognized norms.
3
 These critiques maintain that ATS litigation 
undermines U.S. investment in foreign countries; provokes a 
backlash against the United States in affected countries while also 
angering U.S. allies; and, more generally, reflects a naïve view of 
international relations.
4
 Another common charge is that ATS 
 
† Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. I would like to thank all 
those who organized this symposium and all the symposium participants for their 
observations and comments. I would like to thank Adam Steinman for his comments on an 
earlier draft. I would also like to thank the Editors for their assistance. 
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
2. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
3. See, e.g., Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A Functional 
Approach to the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 153 (2004) (discussing the harms 
that flow from judicial involvement in foreign affairs through ATS litigation); Curtis A. 
Bradley, The Costs of International Human Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 457, 473 
(2001) (describing the costs of ATS litigation). 
4. See Robert Knowles, A Realist Defense of the Alien Tort Statute, 88 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 1117, 1119–21 (2011) (summarizing critiques). 
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litigation represents a form of ―plaintiff’s diplomacy‖ that interferes 
with the executive’s prerogative to make foreign policy.5    
In Kiobel, the Supreme Court appeared to vindicate these 
concerns in holding that the presumption against extraterritoriality 
applies to the ATS, thus limiting suits that may be brought under the 
statute for serious human rights violations that occur in foreign 
territory.
6
 Although the decision to adopt the presumption against 
extraterritoriality was supported only by a five-Justice majority, the 
Court was unanimous in concluding that the ATS did not provide for 
universal jurisdiction and in recognizing that ATS suits could 
potentially undermine U.S. interests.    
This Essay explains how concerns about the adverse 
consequences of human rights litigation underlie Kiobel’s adoption of 
the presumption against extraterritorial application. It also argues, 
however, that those concerns are overstated and ignore the way in 
which ATS litigation can advance U.S. strategic interests. The Essay 
concludes that even as Kiobel imposes a new territorial nexus 
requirement, it leaves open the possibility that some consideration 
may be given in future cases to how ATS suits advance U.S. interests 
in determining whether the presumption against extraterritoriality is 
displaced.  
Part I describes how the various opinions in Kiobel are shaped 
by their respective views of the impact of ATS litigation on the 
United States. Part II describes the potential value of ATS litigation 
for the United States—a point expressly incorporated into Justice 
Breyer’s concurring opinion, which proposes an alternative 
framework for determining when the ATS applies extraterritorially. 
This part thus posits that the supposed conflict between what might 
be termed human rights universalism and national interest realism is 
overstated and that ATS litigation can promote U.S. interests even in 
―foreign-cubed cases,‖ where both parties are foreign nationals and 
the alleged wrongful conduct takes place abroad. Part III examines 
recent Supreme Court decisions addressing the Constitution’s 
extraterritorial reach in war-on-terrorism cases. These decisions 
provide an additional perspective on Kiobel, highlighting the tension 
 
5. See Ralph G. Steinhardt, Laying One Bankrupt Critique to Rest: Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain and the Future of International Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 57 VAND. 
L. REV. 2241, 2243 (2004) (noting critiques that ATS litigation amounts to ―plaintiff’s 
diplomacy‖). See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Bosco, Plaintiff’s Diplomacy, 
FOREIGN AFF., Sept.–Oct. 2000, at 102 (describing the ―plaintiff’s diplomacy‖ phenomenon).  
6. Kiobel, 133 U.S. at 1665. 
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between the Court’s desire to retain some flexibility to adjudicate 
claims of human rights violations that occur abroad and its continued 
attraction to territoriality as a way of limiting the potential adverse 
effect of those claims on U.S. interests. The Essay concludes that 
Kiobel still leaves room for plaintiffs to argue that ATS litigation 
involving human rights violations committed abroad advances U.S. 
interests, where such arguments are supported by evidence of some 
territorial nexus to the United States.  
I. KIOBEL AND THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY 
UNDER THE ATS 
After initially hearing argument in Kiobel on the issue of 
corporate liability, the Supreme Court ordered reargument on the 
broader question of ―[w]hether, and under what circumstances, the 
[ATS] allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of 
the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other 
than the United States.‖7 In its decision, the Court addressed this 
broader question, concluding that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality applies to suits under the ATS. The Court thus 
determined that ATS suits cannot be brought even for Sosa-specific 
torts
8
 where those torts occur in foreign territory, unless the claims 
―touch and concern the territory of the United States‖ with ―sufficient 
force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial 
application.‖9 Applying this test in Kiobel, where the alleged human 
rights violations occurred in Nigeria, and where the plaintiffs and 
defendants were non-U.S. nationals, the Court found the defendants’ 
mere corporate presence in the United States insufficient to displace 
the presumption against extraterritorial application.
10
    
In opposing ATS jurisdiction in Kiobel, the defendants and 
various amici had underscored the adverse foreign policy 
consequences that can result when a U.S. court provides a civil 
remedy for human rights violations that occur in another country. 
Extraterritorial ATS actions, they maintained, expose U.S. officials 
and nationals to jurisdiction by foreign states for U.S.-based conduct 
and undermine U.S. commercial interests.
11
 Further, they rejected the 
 
7. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012) (mem.). 
8. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 730 (2004). 
9. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. 
10. Id. 
11. Supplemental Brief for Respondents at 51–52, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-
1491). 
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suggestion that federal courts can effectively manage these adverse 
effects through case-specific doctrines such as international comity 
and forum non conveniens.
12
 Only a prohibition against applying the 
ATS to torts committed abroad, they argued, could avoid the harmful 
foreign policy consequences associated with civil human rights 
litigation in U.S. courts.
13
 
The United States took a more nuanced position. It argued that 
courts should exercise great restraint when confronting the foreign 
relations and foreign policy consequences of asserting civil 
jurisdiction over conduct that occurs in the territory of another 
sovereign.
14
 In Kiobel, the potential for friction was heightened 
because the defendants were incorporated in the United Kingdom and 
the Netherlands, whose respective governments formally objected to 
the exercise of U.S. jurisdiction.
15
 The U.S. government accordingly 
opposed recognizing ATS actions where the suit ―challenges the 
actions of a foreign sovereign in its own territory, where the 
defendant is a foreign corporation of a third country that allegedly 
aided and abetted the foreign sovereign’s conduct.‖16 While the 
United States sought to leave the door ajar for the ATS’ possible 
future extraterritorial application, it urged restraint and emphasized 
the need for a connection to the United States, as in Filártiga, where 
the defendant’s presence in the United States meant that the United 
States might be perceived as harboring an alleged human rights 
violator. 
Kiobel’s adoption of the presumption against extraterritoriality 
was driven by these perceived adverse foreign policy consequences. 
The presumption, the Kiobel majority explained, ―serves to protect 
against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other 
nations which could result in international discord.‖17 The 
presumption against extraterritoriality has traditionally applied to 
 
12. Id. at 49; see also Sarah H. Cleveland, The Alien Tort Statute, Civil Society, and 
Corporate Responsibility, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 971, 981–82 (2004) (describing the 
―formidable procedural and prudential hurdles‖ ATS plaintiffs must overcome to prevail). 
13. Supplemental Brief for Respondents at 36–37, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-
1491). 
14. Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Partial Support of 
Affirmance at 16–17, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491).  
15. See id. at 17–18. 
16. Id. at 21. 
17. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 
U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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statutes regulating conduct.
18
 The ATS, by contrast, is a jurisdictional 
statute, allowing federal courts to recognize causes of action based on 
sufficiently well-defined norms of international law.
19
 The Kiobel 
majority nevertheless held that the principles underlying the 
presumption against extraterritoriality constrain judicial enforcement 
of the ATS. The Court’s conclusion was driven by its concern about 
the negative foreign policy consequences of judicial involvement. 
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts found that the risk of 
those consequences was magnified in the context of the ATS because 
―the question is not what Congress has done but instead what courts 
may do‖ through their exercise of ATS jurisdiction.20 Kiobel thus 
reflects a deep skepticism not only about the value of human rights 
litigation to the United States, but also about judges’ ability to 
enforce human rights norms without jeopardizing national interests.  
The Court acknowledged that its prior decision in Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain
21
 had placed constraints on the type of claims that 
could be brought under the ATS, requiring that the claims allege 
violations of international law norms that are ―specific, universal, and 
obligatory.‖22 It concluded, however, that Sosa’s limitation on the 
scope of possible ATS claims provided an insufficient check against 
unwarranted judicial interference in foreign policy.
23
 Identifying a 
norm, the Court said, was ―only the beginning of defining a cause of 
action,‖ and judges would still need to address various other issues, 
from determining who could be held liable to assessing the statute of 
limitations—decisions that all carry ―significant foreign policy 
implications.‖24  
The Court also cited adverse foreign policy consequences in 
distinguishing piracy,
25
 which provided the strongest historical 
precedent in favor of the ATS’ extraterritorial application. Of the 
three law-of-nations violations familiar to the Congress that enacted 
the ATS—violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of 
ambassadors, and piracy—piracy alone typically occurred outside the 
 
18. See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) (Securities 
Exchange Act); Aramco, 499 U.S. at 246 (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act). 
19. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664. 
20. Id. at 1664–65. 
21. 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
22. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1665 (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732).  
23. Id.  
24. Id.  
25. Id. at 1667.  
7-Haftez 8/28/2013  9:24 PM 
112 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 28:107 
United States.
26
 Piracy, moreover, does not merely occur on the high 
seas.
27
 The acts that constitute piracy ordinarily take place not on the 
water but on a ship, which, as Justice Breyer observed, is ―like land, 
in that it falls within the jurisdiction of the nation whose flag it 
flies.‖28 The Kiobel majority highlighted the differential impact of 
judicial enforcement of the norm against piracy. An ATS suit 
involving piracy, it said, does not pose the same foreign policy 
concerns as suits for other law-of-nations violations.
29
 Unlike ATS 
suits addressing torture, extrajudicial killing, and other human rights 
abuses, piracy ―does not typically impose the sovereign will of the 
United States onto conduct occurring within the territory of another 
sovereign,‖ and ―therefore carries less direct foreign policy 
consequences.‖30  
The Court further noted instances in which ATS litigation has 
caused diplomatic strife. It cited, by way of example, objections by 
various countries, including Canada, Germany, South Africa, and the 
United Kingdom to the ATS’ extraterritorial application.31 The Court 
also observed that allowing for the ATS’ extraterritorial application 
would suggest that other nations could hale U.S. citizens into court 
for their alleged violations of the law of nations occurring in the 
United States or anywhere else in the world—a result laden with 
damaging foreign policy consequences.
32
  
The assumption that civil human rights litigation under the ATS 
undermines rather than advances U.S. foreign policy and other 
national interests thus pervades the majority opinion in Kiobel and 
provides the rationale for its application of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality. The other main rationale for the presumption 
against extraterritoriality—that Congress ―ordinarily legislates with 
respect to domestic, not foreign matters‖33—provided no support for 
the Court’s decision since the ATS was enacted expressly with 
 
26. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 723–24. 
27. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1667. 
28. Id. at 1672 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment); see also United States v. 
Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 197 (1820) (observing that a crime committed ―within the 
jurisdiction‖ of a foreign state and a crime committed ―in the vessel of another nation‖ are 
―the same thing‖). 
29. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1667. 
30. Id.  
31. Id. at 1669. 
32. Id. 
33. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010); see also EEOC v. 
Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 262 (1991). 
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foreign matters in mind. The Court’s reasoning likely reflects the 
objections to the litigation in Kiobel registered by such close U.S. 
allies as the United Kingdom and Netherlands. It also suggests more 
generally a skeptical view of judicial enforcement of human rights 
norms through civil litigation and an assumption that such 
enforcement undermines U.S. interests rather than furthering them. 
Although the decision to uphold the dismissal of the ATS suit in 
Kiobel was unanimous, the Court divided both on whether and how 
to apply the presumption against extraterritoriality. These opinions 
suggest divergent views about the potential value of ATS litigation to 
the United States. 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Breyer offered a different 
conception of human rights litigation, one that led him to oppose 
applying the presumption of extraterritoriality to the ATS.
34
 Guided 
in part by principles and practices of foreign relations law, Justice 
Breyer identified three circumstances that would provide a basis for 
ATS jurisdiction:  
(1) the alleged tort occurs on American soil, (2) the 
defendant is an American national, or (3) the 
defendant’s conduct substantially and adversely 
affects an important American national interest, and 
that includes a distinct interest in preventing the 
United States from becoming a safe harbor (free of 
civil as well as criminal liability) for a torturer or other 
enemy of mankind.
35
   
Breyer’s first two categories invoke traditional international law 
bases for prescriptive jurisdiction: territoriality and nationality. 
Territoriality rests on a State’s authority over conduct occurring 
within its borders.
36
 Nationality presumes a State’s interest in 
exercising authority over its own citizens, whether as perpetrators or 
victims, even for offenses committed outside the State’s territory.37    
Breyer’s third category represents an amalgam of other 
jurisdictional rationales—the ―effects‖ principle38 and protective 
 
34. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
35. Id. (emphasis added). 
36. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 402(1) (1987). 
37. Id. § 402(2). 
38. Id. § 402(1)(c). 
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jurisdiction
39
 on the one hand, and universal jurisdiction
40 
on the 
other. The effects principle allows for the exercise of prescriptive 
jurisdiction over conduct outside a State’s borders based on its actual 
or intended effect within the State.
41
 The protective principle, which 
the Restatement’s commentary describes as ―a special application of 
the effects principle,‖ similarly allows for the regulation of 
extraterritorial conduct by non-nationals because of the threat posed 
to a State’s security or to a limited class of other State interests.42 
Universal jurisdiction, by contrast, rests on the nature of the offense 
itself—that the particular crime is so egregious that it warrants the 
exercise of jurisdiction by all States, independent of any connection 
to a State’s territory, nationals, or interests.43   
Breyer’s opinion bridges the traditional divide between these 
jurisdictional rationales and challenges the assumption that a State is 
not advancing its own interests when it exercises universal 
jurisdiction. His third category suggests that providing a civil remedy 
under the ATS against those who commit crimes of universal concern 
furthers a distinct U.S. national interest (the protective principle) and 
that failing to provide such a remedy could have a deleterious impact 
on the United States (the effects principle). It thus posits that the 
assertion of jurisdiction over matters of universal concern can 
potentially further a State’s interests and should be exercised where it 
does. 
Breyer does not, however, embrace the traditional concept of 
universal jurisdiction, which would provide for the assertion of 
jurisdiction under the ATS solely based on the conduct itself (i.e., for 
all Sosa-specific torts). Congress adopted the ATS when, as Justice 
Story put it, ―No nation ha[d] ever yet pretended to be the custos 
morum of the whole world.‖44 Not all exercises of universal 
jurisdiction, Breyer suggests, further a nation’s interests. Breyer 
instead sets forth a theory of qualified universal jurisdiction grounded 
 
39. Id. § 402(3). 
40. Id. § 404. 
41. Id. § 402 cmt. d.  
42. Id. § 402 cmt. f; see also Jeffrey A. Meyer, Dual Illegality and Geoambiguous Law: 
A New Rule for Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law, 95 MINN. L. REV. 110, 151 (2010) 
(describing the effects and protective principles). 
43. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404 
cmt. a (1987). 
44. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1674 (2013) (Breyer, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. La Jeune 
Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 847 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551) (Story, J.)). 
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on and ultimately constrained by a State’s own interest in upholding 
widely accepted norms.
45
 Limiting ATS jurisdiction to where 
―distinct American interests‖ support judicial enforcement of 
universally accepted norms, Breyer explains, would fulfill the 
statute’s purpose while helping to minimize international friction.46    
While Breyer’s first two categories provide bright-line rules (i.e., 
necessarily providing for ATS jurisdiction for Sosa-sufficient torts 
that occur on U.S. soil or that are perpetrated by U.S. nationals), the 
national interest category is more open-ended. Breyer does not 
attempt to set forth a list of interests that would anchor jurisdiction 
over an extraterritorial human rights tort, but he makes clear that the 
list includes preventing the United States from becoming a ―safe 
harbor‖ for torturers and others who violate the type of ―specific, 
universal, and obligatory‖ international norms identified in Sosa.47 
Thus, even as Breyer rejects the application of the presumption 
against extraterritoriality, he draws upon notions of territoriality 
through the safe harbor paradigm. Such a territorial nexus—one 
Breyer found absent in Kiobel itself
48—provides both a limitation on 
the scope of ATS jurisdiction and an example of how a State’s own 
interests may be implicated by its exercise. 
The two other concurring opinions in Kiobel offer additional 
perspectives on ATS litigation and its potential consequences. In his 
brief concurrence, Justice Kennedy noted the limited nature of the 
Court’s ruling, observing that the decision ―is careful to leave open a 
number of significant questions regarding the reach and interpretation 
of the Alien Tort Statute.‖49 Other cases, he said, may arise ―with 
allegations of serious violations of international law principles 
protecting persons‖ that are not covered by Kiobel’s ―reasoning and 
holding‖ and that might require ―further elaboration and explanation‖ 
of the presumption against extraterritoriality.
50
 Kennedy’s decision to 
join the majority opinion indicates that he subscribes to the majority’s 
position that ATS litigation can cause adverse foreign policy 
consequences and that he—unlike Breyer—believes a presumption 
against extraterritoriality provides the best way to minimize this risk. 
But Kennedy also suggests that the presumption might need to be 
 
45. See id. at 1674–77. 
46. Id. at 1674.  
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 1677–78. 
49. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
50. Id. 
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qualified in other cases,
51
 including where there is a stronger nexus to 
the United States and, by implication, where the foreign policy effect 
of ATS jurisdiction is different than in Kiobel. Kennedy thus not only 
leaves open the possibility of future ATS litigation for human rights 
violations occurring abroad where the claims ―touch and concern‖ 
U.S. territory with sufficient force to displace the presumption 
against extraterritoriality. He also allows for the possibility that 
courts might consider how future ATS litigation advances U.S. 
interests in determining whether to apply the presumption.   
Justice Alito wrote separately in Kiobel to explain his view of 
how the presumption against extraterritoriality should operate.
52
 
Unlike Kennedy, who opted for ambiguity, Alito sought to outline a 
standard that could help answer the questions left open by what he 
described as the Court’s ―narrow approach‖ and limit future ATS 
cases for human rights abuses occurring abroad.
53
 A putative ATS 
action, Alito said, would ―fall within the scope of the presumption 
against extraterritoriality—and will therefore be barred—unless the 
domestic conduct is sufficient to violate an international law norm 
that satisfies Sosa’s requirements of definiteness and acceptance 
among civilized nations.‖54 Alito thus not only isolates domestic 
conduct as the trigger for ATS jurisdiction, but also maintains that 
this conduct must clear Sosa’s high bar of definiteness and 
acceptance among civilized nations, even if the underlying offense 
itself meets that requirement. Alito would therefore require that ATS 
suits relying on theories of accomplice or participatory liability, such 
as Kiobel, show that the domestic conduct met a Sosa-specific 
international norm regardless of whether the underlying offense itself 
provided a basis for ATS jurisdiction. As a result, Alito’s approach 
appears to exclude consideration of the type of national-interest 
calculation specifically contemplated by Breyer and left open by 
Kennedy. 
II. THE POTENTIAL STRATEGIC VALUE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
LITIGATION UNDER THE ATS  
Much of the extraterritoriality debate in Kiobel presumes that 
applying the ATS to conduct in foreign countries carries negative 
 
51. See id.  
52. Id. at 1670 (Alito, J., concurring). 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
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consequences for the United States. This presumption rests on a false 
dichotomy between human rights universalism and national interest 
realism—one in tension with the history surrounding the ATS and the 
increasing link between human rights, on the one hand, and economic 
development and security, on the other. As a number of scholars have 
described, ATS litigation can advance U.S. interests,
55
 while the 
various harmful scenarios invoked by rogue courts in ATS cases have 
yet to materialize.
56
 
From its inception, universal jurisdiction rested on pragmatic 
considerations. The First Congress enacted the ATS against a 
backdrop of concern about the inadequate vindication of international 
law.
57
 It provided a civil remedy for a narrow set of international law 
offenses that could have serious consequences in international affairs, 
including war.
58
 Although the United States could be held responsible 
for those consequences by failing to provide a remedy, the ATS was 
not so limited, reflecting concerns about the wider ramifications of 
the inadequate enforcement of international law. 
Providing a civil remedy for universal jurisdiction offenses such 
as piracy—even in the absence of a nexus to the United States—was 
understood to promote the international legal order and thereby 
benefit the United States. In adopting this logic, Sosa explained that 
while wide acceptance of the particular norm justified the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction, such jurisdiction was also supported by 
assessments of the value of a federal forum to the United States.  
The rise of modern ATS litigation in the aftermath of Filártiga v. 
Peña-Irala
59
 reflects the growing power and influence of the 
 
55. See, e.g., Knowles, supra note 4, at 1163–73 (describing the strategic benefits of 
ATS litigation); Cleveland, supra note 12, at 971 (contesting the notion that the ATS 
damages U.S. foreign relations or its role in advancing human rights globally); Beth 
Stephens, Upsetting Checks and Balances: The Bush Administration’s Efforts to Limit 
Human Rights Litigation, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 169, 196–204 (2004) (describing the utility 
of ATS litigation for advancing human rights); see also Richard L. Herz, The Liberalizing 
Effects of Tort: How Corporate Complicity under the Alien Tort Statute Advances 
Constructive Engagement, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 207, 209–10 (2008) (maintaining that 
ATS litigation does not damage U.S. foreign relations or undermine democratic reform). 
56. See Knowles, supra note 4, at 1157. 
57. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 716–17 (2004). 
58. See id. at 715. Those offenses were violation of safe conducts, infringement of the 
rights of ambassadors, and piracy. See id. at 724; see also Knowles, supra note 4, at 1163 
(noting that ―[t]he ATS . . . owes its existence to geopolitical interests and realist ends,‖ 
which at the time were to ensure America’s neutrality and avoidance of European 
entanglements). 
59. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
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international human rights movement.
60
 The movement rejects the 
classical Westphalian system of state sovereignty, under which states 
are the only actors of consequence on the international stage. It 
instead maintains that international law protects the freedom and 
dignity of individuals, and that the international system must hold 
states accountable for the treatment of their own citizens.
61
 ATS 
litigation also reflects the related explosion in transitional justice, 
which centers on holding perpetrators accountable for past abuses.
62
 
While transitional justice mechanisms typically focus on criminal 
liability, there is an increasing interest outside the United States in 
establishing civil liability based on universal jurisdiction.
63
 
Protecting human rights is increasingly tied to advancing 
security and economic development. The linkage between human 
rights and collective security has roots in the UN Charter.
64
 
Numerous other UN documents tether human rights to development, 
peace, and security, and the United Nations has demonstrated its 
intent during the past two decades to make human rights a priority in 
its work.
65
 This notion that accountability for human rights violations 
can promote peace and security underlies the UN Security Council’s 
establishment of ad hoc criminal tribunals under its Chapter VII 
 
60. See, e.g., Beth Stephens, Individuals Enforcing International Law: The Comparative 
and Historical Context, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 433, 436–40 (2002) (describing the origins of 
modern ATS litigation). 
61. See Paul R. Dubinsky, Human Rights Law Meets Private Law Harmonization: The 
Coming Conflict, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 211, 212 (2005). 
62. See Sandra Coliver et al., Holding Human Rights Violators Accountable by Using 
International Law in U.S. Courts: Advocacy Efforts and Complementary Strategies, 19 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 169, 185–86 (2005) (explaining how the ATS can serve as a ―catalyst 
for the process of transitional justice in the [victim’s] home country‖). 
63. See, e.g., Vivian Grosswald Curran, Remarks at the GJIL Symposium on Corporate 
Responsibility and Alien Tort Statute, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1019, 1020 (2012) (explaining that 
some European courts have allowed litigants to file tort suits for violations of human rights, 
with at least one court granting recovery).  
64. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3 (establishing that one of the United Nations’ purposes is 
to ―achieve international co-operation in . . . promoting and encouraging respect for human 
rights‖). 
65. See Noëlle Quénivet, Binding the United Nations to Human Rights Norms by Way of 
the Law of Treaties, 42 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 587, 596 (2010). U.N. Security Council 
Resolution 1546, for example, called on ―all forces promoting the maintenance of security 
and stability in Iraq to act in accordance with international law, including obligations under 
international humanitarian law,‖ and also required States to support the United Nations in its 
mission to ―promote the protection of human rights, national reconciliation, and judicial and 
legal reform in order to strengthen the rule of law in Iraq.‖ S.C. Res. 1546, pmbl., ¶ 7(b)(iii), 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (June 8, 2004). 
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powers.
66
 The collective security interest in preventing atrocities by 
states against their own people has been used to justify humanitarian 
interventions under the emerging principle of a responsibility to 
protect.
67
 Economic growth and stability has similarly been tied to 
the protection of basic individual rights,
68
 particularly under rule-of-
law-based approaches.
69
 Human rights are important to all major 
European institutions: the Council of Europe, the European Union, 
and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which 
has described human rights protection as an integral component of 
the new European security system in the twenty-first century.
70
 The 
U.S. government frequently describes human rights as ―an essential 
element of American global foreign policy.‖71 
ATS litigation seeks to advance human rights by providing 
victims with a federal forum for the enforcement of a subset of 
sufficiently well-defined and established violations. The presumption 
that the statute’s extraterritorial application will necessarily interfere 
with U.S. foreign policy is at odds with the growing linkage between 
human rights and security. It obscures the degree to which providing 
a federal forum—even in the absence of a U.S. nexus—can further 
U.S. strategic interests by promoting respect for human rights and 
advancing perceptions of its commitment to the enforcement of 
universally accepted norms.
72
   
 
66. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Decision on Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 38 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 
2, 1995) (―The Security Council has resorted to the establishment of a judicial organ in the 
form of an international criminal tribunal as an instrument for the exercise of its own 
principal function of maintenance of peace and security . . . . ‖). 
67. See Saira Mohamed, Taking Stock of the Responsibility to Protect, 48 STAN. J. INT’L 
L. 319, 319, 326–30 (2012). See generally INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE 
SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2001). 
68. See, e.g., U.N. MILLENNIUM PROJECT, INVESTING IN DEVELOPMENT: A PRACTICAL 
PLAN TO ACHIEVE THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS 110–25 (2005) (discussing the 
importance of good governance, including promotion of human rights, to economic 
development). 
69. See KENNETH W. DAM, THE LAW-GROWTH NEXUS: THE RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 14 (2006). 
70. See Alla Fedorova & Olena Sviatun, The Implementation of the Human Rights 
Universality Principle in Ukraine, 16 IUS GENTIUM 405, 412 (2012). 
71. Colum Lynch, U.S. to Seek Seat on U.N. Human Rights Council, Reversing Bush 
Policy, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2009, at A2 (quoting Secretary of State Hillary Rodham 
Clinton, announcing that the Obama administration would ―seek a seat‖ on the UN Human 
Rights Council). 
72. See Knowles, supra note 4, at 1168–69 (describing the potential reputational value of 
compliance with international human rights law). 
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Not all conflict, moreover, undermines U.S. interests. As 
Professor William Dodge has observed in the anti-trust context, the 
extraterritorial application of U.S. law has led in the long run to a 
series of agreements between the United States and other countries 
that promote cooperation, even though it has caused some short-term 
friction.
73
 The possibility for transforming friction into cooperation is 
arguably greater for ATS litigation given that the underlying norm 
must be universal in nature, even if there is disagreement over the 
best means of enforcing it. 
III. THE CONSTITUTION’S EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION IN THE 
WAR ON TERROR: ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE ON THE POTENTIAL 
VALUE AND COSTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION  
The Supreme Court’s decisions in the Guantánamo detainee 
habeas corpus cases have grappled with similar questions concerning 
the strategic value of enforcing human rights norms in federal court. 
In 2008, the Court held in Boumediene v. Bush
74
 that the habeas 
corpus right guaranteed by the Constitution’s Suspension Clause 
applied to Guantánamo.
75
 Unlike Kiobel, Boumediene involved the 
extraterritorial application of a constitutional provision, and not of a 
federal statute. Also unlike Kiobel, Boumediene challenged U.S. 
action rather than conduct by foreign officials. The resistance to 
federal jurisdiction in Boumediene thus centered more on concerns 
about judicial interference with executive decision-making and 
military operations than with foreign relations. Despite these 
differences, Boumediene and other detainee habeas cases provide a 
useful perspective on Kiobel’s treatment of extraterritoriality, the 
perceived consequences of enforcing human rights norms in federal 
court, and the degree to which territoriality is viewed as a constraint 
on the exercise of judicial power. 
Until 2008, the central question in the Guantánamo detainee 
litigation concerned whether the courts could ever exercise habeas 
jurisdiction over detentions outside the United States. This question 
was often framed as a conflict between the individual’s right to be 
free from unlawful executive imprisonment, on the one hand, and the 
impropriety and risks of judicial review of executive action during 
wartime, on the other. In arguing against a federal forum for review 
 
73. William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 85, 122 (1998). 
74. 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
75. Id. at 728. 
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of executive detentions, the government relied on a combination of 
two factors: alienage (the Guantánamo detainees were all non-
citizens) and territoriality (Guantánamo was located outside 
sovereign U.S. territory). Territoriality was thus viewed as a 
limitation on the exercise of federal judicial power, which the 
government argued would be detrimental to the nation’s interests.    
In Rasul v. Bush,
76
 the Court held that the general federal habeas 
statute applied to Guantánamo.
77
 The Court concluded that the 
presumption against extraterritorial application did not apply because 
of the ―complete jurisdiction and control‖ that the U.S. exercised over 
the Guantánamo naval base.
78
 It also noted that the government 
conceded that the habeas statute would extend to U.S. citizens 
detained there, undermining its own argument for invoking the 
presumption.
79
 The Court thus concluded that Guantánamo was not 
extraterritorial, at least not for purposes of applying the federal 
habeas statute. It did not, however, address whether any 
constitutional guarantees applied to Guantánamo detainees.   
After Congress eliminated the statutory basis for habeas 
jurisdiction over Guantánamo detentions,
80
 the Court had to confront 
the question of the Constitution’s application. In holding that the 
Suspension Clause applied to Guantánamo,
81
 Boumediene rejected 
the government’s argument for a categorical rule based on 
territoriality and citizenship. Writing for a five-Justice majority, 
Justice Kennedy adopted a functional test, which drew upon Justice 
Harlan’s flexible methodology in Reid v. Covert82 and his own 
concurrence in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.
83
 As Kennedy 
explained, ―whether a constitutional provision has extraterritorial 
effect depends upon the particular circumstances, the practical 
necessities, and possible alternatives which Congress had before it 
and, in particular, whether judicial enforcement of provision would 
be impracticable and anomalous.‖84 Kennedy then distilled these 
 
76. 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
77. Id. at 481. 
78. Id. at 480–81. 
79. Id. 
80. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). 
81. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 728 (2008). 
82. 354 U.S. 1 (1954). 
83. 494 U.S. 259, 278 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
84. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 759 (quoting Reid, 354 U.S. at 74–75 (Harlan, J., 
concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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general principles into a multi-factored test to determine the 
extraterritorial application of the Suspension Clause. Those factors 
include: ―(1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the 
adequacy of the process through which that status determination was 
made; (2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and then 
detention took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in 
resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to the writ.‖85 Applying this test, 
the Court found that the Suspension Clause ―has full effect‖ at 
Guantánamo.
86
 While Boumediene did not address either the 
application of other constitutional provisions to Guantánamo or the 
application of the Suspension Clause to other U.S.-run detention 
facilities, such as Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan, it 
established that there was no categorical presumption against the 
Constitution’s extraterritorial application. 
Boumediene may be understood as a pragmatic, situation-
specific approach to the problem of Guantánamo. But it also suggests 
a recognition that enforcement of fundamental individual rights in 
federal court can advance U.S. strategic interests. Kennedy 
acknowledged the risks that judicial review of wartime detentions 
could potentially pose and urged judges to exercise caution and 
appropriate deference to executive branch officials in considering 
detainee habeas petitions.
87
 But he also noted, ―Security subsists, too, 
in fidelity to freedom’s first principles. Chief among these are 
freedom from arbitrary and unlawful restraint and the personal liberty 
that is secured by adherence to the separation of powers.‖88 
Boumediene had been preceded by years of criticism over 
Guantánamo, where detainees had been brought deliberately to avoid 
judicial review and to facilitate the creation of what had been termed 
a ―legal black hole.‖89 Guantánamo had been attacked by America’s 
allies, the United Nations, and non-government organizations, and 
was widely perceived as undermining U.S. interests and counter-
terrorism efforts—a perception that led ultimately to President 
 
85. Id. at 766. 
86. Id. at 771. 
87. Id. at 796–97. 
88. Id. at 797. 
89. Jules Lobel, Separation of Powers, Individual Rights, and the Constitution Abroad, 
98 IOWA L. REV. 1629, 1666 (2013) (quoting 2003 lecture by British Law Lord, Johan Steyn, 
Guantánamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole, 53 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1 (2004), available at 
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract? fromPage=online&aid=1523512). 
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Obama’s decision to close the detention center.90 Habeas jurisdiction 
provided a way to counter this perception and to legitimate the 
exercise of government detention power through judicial review. 
Although the right to habeas was grounded in domestic law, it 
mirrors protections under international human rights law, particularly 
the right to be free from arbitrary detention and from the torture and 
other mistreatment historically associated with such detention. 
Boumediene thus also reflects the Court’s understanding that 
providing a federal forum for vindicating human rights guarantees 
can further the nation’s interests, even where the conduct occurs 
beyond its borders. 
At the same time, however, the Court continued to view 
territoriality as a constraint on federal judicial power. It emphasized 
that ―[i]n every practical sense Guantánamo is not abroad; it is within 
the constant jurisdiction of the United States.‖91 The Court 
distinguished Guantánamo from Landsberg Prison in post-World War 
II Germany, which was under the temporary authority of the 
combined allied forces,
92
 thus weighing against the exercise of 
habeas jurisdiction in Johnson v. Eisentrager.
93
 Boumediene thus not 
only underscored the importance of territorial control as a factor in 
determining whether courts should engage in review, but also 
emphasized the exclusivity and permanency of U.S. control over 
Guantánamo.  
In addition, Boumediene suggested that the risk of friction with a 
foreign government could provide a possible limitation on the 
Suspension Clause’s extraterritorial application.94 It noted that no 
Cuban court has jurisdiction over U.S. military personnel at 
Guantánamo or those detained there, and that the United States is 
―answerable to no other sovereign for its acts on the base there.‖95    
Since Boumediene, a federal district and appeals court have 
addressed the Suspension Clause’s application to U.S. detentions at 
Bagram in Afghanistan. These cases reinforce the continued salience 
of territoriality notwithstanding Boumediene’s rejection of a 
 
90. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on National Security (May 21, 
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-
On-National-Security-5-21-09. 
91. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 768. 
92. Id. 
93. 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
94. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 770. 
95. Id.  
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categorical bar to the Constitution’s extraterritorial application and 
demonstrate a skeptical view of judicial enforcement of human rights 
violations occurring outside the nation’s borders. In Al Maqaleh v. 
Gates,
96
 the district court held that the Suspension Clause did not 
extend to Bagram detainees, with the exception of the small 
percentage of non-Afghan nationals who had been seized outside of 
Afghanistan and brought to Bagram.
97
 The court acknowledged that 
the U.S. possessed a high degree of control over Bagram, although it 
said that control was less complete and more impermanent than at 
Guantánamo.
98
 The court also noted that the process that the United 
States had afforded to Bagram detainees fell ―well short‖ of the 
process provided to Guantánamo prisoners and deemed inadequate in 
Boumediene, thus suggesting that the risk of arbitrary and unlawful 
detention was greater at Bagram than at Guantánamo.
99
 The district 
court, however, emphasized the practical obstacles in reviewing 
detentions in a war zone. Such review might not only impact the U.S. 
military mission but also cause friction with the host government, 
particularly since a significant percentage of Bagram detainees were 
expected to be transferred to the Afghan government.
100
 As the court 
explained, ―It is by no measure unlikely that a federal court—sitting 
in the United States and applying standards used in analogous habeas 
cases involving Guantánamo detainees—would arrive at a different 
result than an Afghan court applying an entirely different process and 
legal standards.‖101   
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit held that the Suspension Clause did 
not extend to any detainees at Bagram.
102
 Applying Boumediene’s 
functional test, the D.C. Circuit established a complete bar to the 
Constitution’s extraterritorial application to U.S. detention operations 
in Afghanistan. Like the district court, the D.C. Circuit emphasized 
Bagram’s location in a theater of war and the potential risk habeas 
review could pose to ongoing military operations.
103
 It further noted 
the risk of generating friction with the Afghan government—a risk 
that extended not only to review of the detention of Afghan nationals 
(as the district court had concluded), but also to review of the 
 
96. 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2009). 
97. Id. at 235. 
98. Id. at 220–26. 
99. Id. at 227. 
100. Id. at 229–30. 
101. Id. at 229. 
102. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
103. Id. at 97–98. 
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detention non-Afghan nationals seized outside of Afghanistan, who 
were being held pursuant to a cooperative arrangement with the 
Afghan government.
104
   
Another war-on-terrorism habeas decision expressed similar 
concerns with federal court adjudication of human rights abuses that 
occur in foreign territory. In Munaf v. Geren,
105
 which was issued the 
same day as Boumediene, the Supreme Court addressed the detention 
of two U.S. citizens by the Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I), an 
international coalition operating in Iraq.
106
 In their habeas actions, the 
petitioners challenged both their detention by the MNF-I, which they 
argued was arbitrary and unlawful, and their contemplated transfer to 
Iraq to face criminal proceedings, which they argued was illegal and 
would likely result in their torture.
107
 The Court held that federal 
courts had habeas jurisdiction to consider the petitions.
108
 Although 
an international force in a foreign country was holding the prisoners, 
it said, the United States retained ultimate control and authority over 
their detention, thus bringing them within scope of the federal habeas 
statute.
109
 The Court also held, however, that federal courts could 
provide no relief and that the petitions should be dismissed.
110
 It 
underscored not only Iraq’s sovereign right to prosecute the detainees 
for offenses committed within its territory,
111
 but also the adverse 
foreign-relations consequences inherent in federal-court adjudication 
of their claims, including of their transfer-to-torture claim.
112
    
To varying degrees, these war-on-terrorism cases suggest the 
continued salience of what Kal Raustiala has termed ―legal 
spatiality‖—the principle that law and legal remedies are connected 
to, or limited by, territorial location.
113
 Boumediene’s rejection of a 
categorical bar to the Constitution’s extraterritorial application to 
non-citizens in favor of a functional, case-by-case assessment of the 
implications of extending a particular right to a particular location 
indicates a resistance to bright-line rules based on territoriality. 
Boumediene further suggests that enforcing human rights norms in 
 
104. Id. at 99. 
105. 553 U.S. 674 (2008). 
106. Id. at 679.  
107. Id. at 692. 
108. Id. at 688.  
109. Id. at 685–87. 
110. Id. at 692. 
111. Id. at 694–95. 
112. Id. at 700–03. 
113. Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501, 2503 (2005). 
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federal court can advance national interests, even where the violation 
occurs beyond the country’s borders. But Boumediene’s emphasis on 
the nature of U.S. control over Guantánamo—both total and 
permanent—highlights how territoriality continues to constrain such 
enforcement. The Bagram habeas cases demonstrate a continued 
skepticism towards the Constitution’s extraterritorial application and 
a fear about its impact both on U.S. military operations and U.S. 
relations with other states. Munaf registers similar concerns, with its 
emphasis on the potential harm to U.S. foreign relations if federal 
courts were to conduct habeas review of extraterritorial detention and 
transfer decisions, even in the limited category of cases involving 
U.S. citizens.    
The response of lower courts to civil damages actions arising 
from U.S. detention and interrogation practices in the war on 
terrorism reflects similar concerns about the negative foreign affairs 
consequences of federal court litigation challenging human rights 
abuses committed overseas, even where the gravamen of those 
actions is against U.S. officials or U.S. defendants.
114
 These cases, 
several of which have raised claims under the ATS, have typically 
been decided based on state secrets
115
 or other justiciability doctrines, 
such as Bivens ―special factors,‖116 rather than on extraterritoriality 
grounds. They nonetheless reflect similar fears among judges about 
the harm such litigation could cause to U.S. foreign policy and 
relations.
117
   
These decisions help place Kiobel in a broader context and 
highlight parallels among cases aimed at remedying human rights 
violations that occur outside the United States. Like Kiobel, the 
decisions suggest that even where the Supreme Court has declined to 
foreclose judicial enforcement through the adoption of categorical 
 
114. See, e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2010) (en 
banc) (dismissing suit against company for helping provide and operate flights used in the 
U.S. government’s extraordinary rendition program, which involved the movement of 
terrorism suspects among secret overseas detention centers for torture and other harsh 
interrogation methods); Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (dismissing 
suit challenging plaintiff’s rendition to the United States to Syria for torture and other 
mistreatment); El-Masri v. Tenet, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007) (dismissing suit against U.S. 
officials and corporate defendants for their role in plaintiff’s rendition to and torture at a 
secret prison in Afghanistan). 
115. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
116. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 
396 (1971). 
117. Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1081–82; Arar, 585 F.3d at 575–76; El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 
303–04, 312–13. 
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rules, it still relies on territoriality to avoid what it perceives as the 
potentially significant strategic costs of human rights litigation in 
federal courts. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decision ultimately to frame the issue in 
Kiobel as one of extraterritoriality rather than corporate liability 
suggests that its principal concern over ATS litigation centered on 
judicial enforcement of human rights norms that occur abroad and 
lack a significant nexus to the United States. This concern was 
magnified in Kiobel, which threatened foreign corporations with civil 
liability for a joint subsidiary’s alleged complicity in human rights 
violations in a foreign country. The Kiobel majority based its 
adoption of the presumption against extraterritorial application on the 
perceived harmful foreign policy consequences resulting from 
litigation that lacked a sufficient nexus to the United States, even if 
that litigation was limited to a narrow category of universally 
recognized and well-defined torts.   
Kiobel’s scope, however, remains uncertain. Marty Lederman 
has identified three familiar types of ATS cases that Kiobel appears 
to suggest are unresolved: (1) cases alleging Sosa-sufficient torts 
committed overseas by U.S. defendants; (2) cases such as Filártiga, 
in which a foreign defendant uses the United States as a safe harbor, 
thus preventing other states from bringing him to justice; and (3) 
cases in which a defendant allegedly engaged in conduct in the 
United States that contributed materially to a violation of a Sosa-
sufficient international norm, but where that U.S. conduct alone is 
insufficient to establish the violation (in contrast to Kiobel, which 
alleged only corporate presence in the United States).
118
 In these 
cases, future courts may be called upon to determine whether 
particular ATS claims involving human rights violations committed 
abroad ―touch and concern‖ U.S. territory with ―sufficient force to 
displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.‖119 As 
they conduct this ―touch and concern‖ analysis, it remains to be seen 
whether, and to what extent, courts will consider the potential 
 
118. Marty Lederman, What Remains of the ATS?, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 18, 2013, 6:40 PM), 
http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/18/kiobel-insta-symposium-what-remains-of-the-ats/. 
119. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013). 
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consequences—adverse or beneficial—that hearing those ATS claims 
will have on the United States.
120
   
As described above, the Kiobel majority’s rationale for adopting 
the presumption against extraterritoriality was the potential adverse 
foreign policy consequences of ATS litigation.
121
 Justice Breyer’s 
concurrence, by contrast, highlights the adverse consequences of not 
recognizing an ATS cause of action in certain circumstances—for 
example, where the United States might be seen as providing safe 
harbor to a war criminal or genocidaire.
122
 Breyer thus acknowledges 
that ATS litigation can serve U.S. interests. His opinion, coupled with 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, which notes that the decision leaves 
open ―a number of significant questions,‖123 suggests a continued 
window for plaintiffs to argue and courts to consider the value of 
ATS litigation to the United States, even where the human rights 
violations occurred abroad. While a U.S. interest in human rights 
norm enforcement—without any territorial nexus—will unlikely 
provide a stand-alone basis for jurisdiction given the majority opinion 
in Kiobel, it could bolster arguments for jurisdiction where there is 
such a nexus. Future cases will have to grapple with unanswered 
questions surrounding the required territorial nexus and, relatedly, the 
degree to which concerns about providing—or denying—a federal 
forum for enforcing human rights violations that occur overseas may 
nevertheless be understood to ―touch and concern‖ the United States. 
 
120. In one early post-Kiobel decision, the district court dismissed plaintiffs’ ATS claims 
against a U.S. military contractor for its role in their torture and mistreatment in Iraq during 
the period of U.S. occupation. See Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., No. 1:08-cv-827 
(GBL/JFA), 2013 WL 3229720 (E.D. Va. June 25, 2013), appeal filed, No. 13-1937 (4th 
Cir. July 26, 2013). In dismissing the claims, the district court narrowly interpreted the 
Kiobel’s ―touch and concern‖ language and noted the potential harmful foreign policy 
consequences of ATS litigation. Id. at *8–*9. The court, moreover, ignored the possible 
benefits to the United States of exercising jurisdiction, particularly where the defendant is a 
U.S. corporation headquartered in the United States. 
121. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664–65.  
122. Id. at 1674–77 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).  
123. Id. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
